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It is well known that job mobility is an important characteristic of
the working life histories of individuals. Labor Department data indicate
that on the average a young man at age twenty can expect to have 6.6 job
changes during the next forty years of his working life. While the ex-
pected number of job changes declines over the life cycle, it is inter-
esting to note that men aged 45—54 still exoect to change jobs an addi-
tional 1.4 tines prior to retirement.1 Due to lack of microdata, earli
studies of job mobility were unable to analyze individual mobility
patterns; rather, these studies examined the determinants of inter—
industry job separation.2
The recent availability of longitudinal data on earnings and job
histories has allowed researchers to significantly expand the study of
job mobility. For examole, Parnes and Nestel (1975) studied the
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determinants arid conseauences of job changing using the National Longitudinal
Survey of Mature Men (NLs). Their most ixnoortant findings were that the
probability of quitting a job was systematically related to job tenure, job
satisfaction, the existence of private pension plans and the individual's
current wage. Using the same data set, Borjas (1975) analyzed the effects
of differential lifetime mobility patterns on the current earnings of mature
men by estimating a "segmented" earnings function——that is, relating the
individual's earnings to his job history. The study suggested the exis-
tence of a strong positive relationship between humancapitalinvestment
and job duration. Finally, Bartel (1975), using the Coleman—Possi Retro-
spective Life History Study, was able to decompose post-school earnings
growth into gains occurring on the job and gains due to job mobility. It
was shown that while inter—firm mobility had a positive effect on earnings
growth through the wage gain obtained across jobs, the more mobile individ-
uals had significantly lower wage growth per time period within the job.
The use of longitudinal (life—cycle) data, therefore, has provided econo-
mists with new insights into an important characteristic of labor markets,
namely job mobility.
Our paper uses the wealth of information available in the NLS to ex-
pand on previous work in several ways. First, we investigate whether there
is a meaningful distinction among types of job separations. Traditional
analysis has categorized job separations as either emnloyee—initiated
(quits) or employer—initiated (layoffs). We question whether this
dichotomy is correct. For example, a person who quits his job for per-
sonal (exogenous) reasons, such as health, has a different motivation—3—
than a quitter in search of a better job. This argument would suggest the
need for a more detailed breakdown of quits. On the other hand, it has
recently been argued that it is irrelevant which party to the "contract"
initiates the separation.3 A job can be viewed as a match (or marriage)
between employer and employee. Since the separation is solely determined
by the existence of an improper match, it is unnecessary to know which
party initiated the separation in order to know the factors determining
the separation. This line of reasoning would, of course, lead to the
conclusion that the quit—layoff breakdown is meaningless and that seara—
tion rates should be the focus of the analysis.
The National Longitudinal Survey data is especially useful for
studying the relationshin between wages and the probability of quitting.
Most theoretical work on the determinants of job separation concludes
that the probability of changing jobs is related to a reservation wage.
The NLS data set allows us to test this relationship since it includes
information on the individual's "hypothetical wage"-—that is, the wage
required to induce the individual to accept another job. Given this in—
formation, we are able to compare the effects of different measures of
the individual's price of time (e.g. the current wage and the reserva-
tion wage) on the probability of quitting. In addition, we analyze the
role of human capital variables, job related characteristics and family
backgroundin the determinationof job mobility.
3Fora discussion of this hypcthesis in termsof the marriage market,
seeBecker, Landes, andMichael(1976).—4—
Theanalysis of the determinants of job separations in the cross—
section naturally leads to an investigation of the relationship between
previous separations and future separations. In particular, we consider
whethersuch a relationship exists, and whether the nature of previous
separations is a good predictor of the nature of future separations.
Finally, we analyze the effects of job mobility on earnings and on
job satisfaction. We distinguish between the immediate gains to mobility
andthefuture gains to mobility, and also consider whether the nature of
the separation is an important determinant of the consequences of job
mobility.
Part II of the paper presents a brief framework for the analysis of
job mobility. It will review various theories that have been presented
in the literature to explain quit—layoff phenomena. In Part III, we
conduct an empirical analysis of the determinants of job separations
and consider whether the distinction between quits and layoffs is indeed
appropriate. Part IV analyzes the effects of job mobility on wage growth
both in the short— and long—runs. A susary of the empirical results is
presented in Part V.
I. A Framework for the Analysis of Job Mobility—
Economictheory predicts that anindividual will attempt to sellhis
services in the market which offers him the highest return. This simple
concept was first applied by Sjaastad (1962) to the analysis of labor
mobility in his study of internal migration in the United States.4 The
4See Polachek and Horvath (1976) fora more recent analysis of geographic
mobility using individual, instead of aggregate, data.—5—
individualis assumedtocalculate his discounted net return from migrating
at timet,and basehisdecision to move on whether the net return is posi-
tive. In the case of job mobility, the individual will engage in a similar
calculation of the discounted net returns from leaving his current job.
Hence for the th worker, the probability of quitting in his th year of




where: Y. .isthe present value of the expected real income stream if the
13
individualleaves his current job in job year j, Y.,. is the present value
ofthe expected real income stream in the current job calculated at job
year j.5 Equation (1) suggests the following implications:(1) the
higher the value of the current job, the less likely the individual is to
quit his job; (2) the better the alternatives available to the individual
relative to the current job, the more likely a quitwilltake place; (3)
thelonger the time remaining until retirement, the greater the gain from
quitting since the returns to mobility can be collected over a longer
period of time.
Ofcourse,not all jobseparations need be initiated bc' theemolovee.
Atjob year j, theemployer will compare his estimate of the worker's
marginal revenueproduct, to the wage he is currently paying the
50f course, equation (1) implicitly nets out the costs ofmobility which
may vary across individuals.—6—
worker, w... The employer will then lay off those workers whose marginal
revenue products fall below the wage. Thus the probability of laying off
the th worker after j years of lob tenure, i.., can be expressed as:6
2...=g(MP..— w..) (2)
13 13 13
Clearlythe higher the labor costs, the higher the probability of a layoff
since 2... is negatively related to the difference between marginal revenue
product andlabor costs.7
Wenowturnto an analysis of the process by which the differentials
inequations (1) and (2) lead to job separations.
A. The Matching Hypothesis
One approach to the study of a job mobility is to view turnover as
the result of an imperfect match between employer and employee.8 Accord-
ing to this hypothesis, the worker and the firm learn about each other
6Wecan interpret 1P.. asthe stream ofmarginal products received by
the firm during the worker's tenure. Similarly, w,. can be interpreted
as the discounted stream of all labor costs (e.g. wages, fringe benefits,
etc.)Note that the worker's perception of the value of the job, Y..,
includes w. and any other jobconsumption benefits obtained bythe worker
in that job.
7Notethat our analysis focuses on permanent layoffs. For a discussion
of temporarylayoffs,see Feldstein (1976).
8SeeBecker, Landes, and Michael (1976) foran application of the matching
hypothesisto marital instability; Jovanovic (1976) develops a model of job
matching in the labor market.—7—
duringthe first few years of the worker's tenure. If they determine that
they have been imperfectly matched with one another (i.e. the worker is
not suitable for the job), a separation will occur. Thus this aptroach
predicts a negative relationship between job tenure and separations.
In the matching model developed by Jovanovic (1976), the employer adjusts
wages to theworker'sproductivity as he learns about the latter over
time. If the worker's productivity (and hence the wage) falls below the
level which is attainable in other firms, the worker will quit. Since
those employees that remain at the firm will be those whose productivity
(and hence wages) are high, there will be a positive correlation between
wage levels andjobtenure. Thus the matching hypothesis predicts a
negative relationship between wages andsearations,not holding job
tenure constant. Once tenure is held constant, we would expect this
negative relationship to be weaker, since for a given tenure level there
will be a smaller variation in productivity across individuals within
the firm.
Note that since the wage is assed to be adjusted to equal the
worker's productivity, layoffs will never occur in this model. The
fact that a separation might be officially recorded as a sIlayoffII is
basically a matter of semantics andmightin fact be due to the
reluctance to cutwagesbelow the going entrance wage or to eligibility
constraints in unemploymentcompensationprograms. Therefore an impor-
tant conclusion of the matching hyothesis is that there is no useful
distinction between a quit andalayoff. Finally, it is important to
note that because learning about the job is likely to takearelatively
shortperiodof time, the matching hypothesis is most relevant for
understandingturnover in the early years of job tenure.—8—
B. The Specific Training Hviothesis
Alternative models of job separation have focused on the concet of
fixed costs of employment.9 It is argued that when a firm hires a worker
it incurs certain fixed costs in the form of hiring andtrainingcosts.
The immediate implication of the existence of these fixed costs is that
workers with a higher degree of "fixity" are less likely to be laid off
during periods of slack demand since the employer has an incentive to
recoup his investment. This model, of course, can be generalized such
that fixed costs are borne by both workers and employers (e.g. specific
training), and therefore workers with a higher degree of fixity are less
10
likely to quit.
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where
S =workerfinanced specific trainina w
=firmfinanced specific training
Equations(3)and (4) state that the probability of quitting (layoff) is
9See Ci (1962),Rosen (1968) and Becker (1975).
101nParsons' (1972) model of specific training, implications are de-
rived for both quit and layoff behavior.—9—
a negative function of worker (firm) financed specific training. We can
expressSas a function of the wage and skills (e.g. education, E) by
notingthat an individual's wage can be defined as:
(5)
Equation (5)implies:
w'l 10 S =— — — E—— (6)
W y2 12
Substituting (6) into (3) yields;
____ a1 ____ = — )— — W+ E (7)
12 2 12
Thereforethe soecific training hvothesis oredicts that the probability
of quitting is inversely related to the wage rate and positively related
toeducation (i.e.. skills). It canbe seen that if SW andS areposi-
tively correlated, the wage andeducationcoefficients will be qualita-
tively similarin the quit and layoff ecuations. Hcwever if S and S., w
arenegatively correlated, then wages will have a oositiveeffectwhile
education will have a negative effect on layoffs. One would expect to
observe a positive correlation between andSi
however, since substan-
tial specific training' investment is likely to takeplaceonly after the
matching process has been completed.— 10—
C.The Job Search Hvnothesis
Another approach to the analysis of job mobility is suggested by the
existence of imperfect information in the labor market.11 It has been
shown that imperfect information on the part of employers and employees
creates a non—degenerate distribution of wage offers for given skills.12
This wage dispersion is likely to affect the labor turnover decisions of
bothindividualsand firms.
We can easily derive the implications of the existence of wage dis-
persion on the probability of quitting by considering equation (1).
Clearlythe higher the currentwage relative to alternatives the lower
theprobabilityof quitting. In the case of layoffs, the effect of the
wage is not as clear: The worker may be receiving a higher relative
wage in this firm than elsewhere since his productivity in this particu—
lar firm may also be relatively higher. The effect is nil if wages are
adjustedto productivity, but positive if discrepancies between wages
and productivity are larger at higher wage levels and are not eliminated.
D. Compensating Differentials
It hasbeenargued that the relationship between wages and separa-
tionrates is another example of thetheory of compensating wage differ—
13
enttals. Workers who are employed in industries that have high layoff
11For basic models of job search see McCall (1970), Mortensen (1970) and
thesurvey article by Lipoman and McCall(1976).
12Foraderivation of thisdistribution see Mortensen (1974).
13Forexample, see Hall (1970). Of course, this argument dates back to
Adam Smith who specifically mentioned job stability as a determinant of
wage differentials across types of jobs.— 11
rates will demand a wage premiumtocomensate them for the job instability.
Thus we would exect to find a positive correlation between wages and the
probability of a layoff.14
E. Summary
Wehave discussed four hypotheses thatexaminetherelationshinsbe-
tween wages and quit and layoff rates. As an aid to the reader we summa—
rize thesepredictions in Table1 below.
TABLE1










Job search — ?
Coroensating differentials ? +
Note that these nredictjons have been made under the assuxnstion that job
tenure is not held constant in the equation. If job tenure were held
14Pencavel(1972) argues that each einnloyer selects a particular wage—
quit stratecy such that the lower the quit rate an employer is willina
to tolerate the higher the wage rate he must nay, thus resulting in a
negative correlation between the nrobability of quitting and the wage
rate.The problem with this nrediction is that those industries which
carryout this policy might beprecisely those industries with high
cuitrates.— ha-
constant,we have shownearlier that thenegative effects of the wage on
the quit and layoff rates would be weaker or possibly vanish according to
the xnatching hypothesis. For the other hypotheses, however, the predic-
tions of signsareinvariant with respect to job tenure.
II. The DeterminantsofJob Mobility
In this section we present an empirical analysis of the determinants
of job mobility. The data set used is the National Longitudinal Surveyof— 12—
MatureMen (aged 45—59 in 1966) which provides continuous information on
work and earnings histories between 1966 and 1971.15 To simplify the
empirical analysis, we restrict our sample to consist of all white men who
reported a wage rate in 1966, who renorted key variables such as education
andjobmobility oatterns, and who were still in the labor force in 1971.
We also limit our sample to individuals who experienced no geographic
mobility during the period in order to focus on job mobility within the
local labor market. We avoid the problem of individuals being recalled
from a layoff by defining job mobility as a change in employers. Thus
recalls would not be measured as job searations. Moreover, by deleting
migrants andretireesfrom the sample of job changers, we further under-
estimate the true separation rate. Any additional restrictions on the
samplewillbe discussed as the results are presented.
Table 2 shows the mean probabilities of job separation for our samle.
It can be seen that despite the age range of the samole we observe a high
degree of job separation. In fact, within a five—year period, 22 percent
of the samole changed employers. Note, however, that about half of these
seoarations were eplover—initiated——i.e. layoffs or firings. This leaves
a remarkable amount of quits considering the average age of thesatnole.
Whenwesegment the five—year period into shorter tine soans, 1966—69 and
1969—71, we see clear evidence of the effect of a downturn in the business
cycle on the type of job separations that occur. For example, in the
1966—69 period, 57 percent of all job separations were auits, while in
15See U.S. Department of Labor(1970),Manoower Research Monograh No. 15
for a comolete discussion of the survey.— 13
TABLE2
Probabilitiesof 3obSeparationby Education
Variable s8 9 ._s<1]. s =12 s .13 All Men
1966—69
Separation
rates .212 .167 .165 .129 .175
1969—71
Separation
rates .115 .095 .100 .102 .105
1966—71
Separation
rates .236 .212 .222 .180 .217
Percent of 1966—69
separations that
are quits .514 .551 .618 .674 .570
Percent of 1969—71
separations that
are quits .356 .316 .490 -.441 .393
Percent of 1966—71
separations that
are quits .530 .542 .586 .617 .558
Percent of 1966—69
quitsthatare
job—related .669 .598 .618 .621 .635
Percent of 1969—71
quits that are
job—related .683 1.000 .490 .533 .649
Percent of 1966—71
quits that are
job—related .640 .565 .592 .567 .599
Saxnplesize 641 400 491 333 1,865— 14—
1969—71,the statistic was 39 percent. Although job separations decline
with educational attainment for this sample, it is interesting to note
that the proportion of job separations that are quits increases with
education. This pattern, however, is not as clear during the economic
downturn of 1969-71. In Table 2, we also find that about 60 percent of
all quits are due to "job—related" reasons. An individual is assumed
to have quit for job—related reasons if his quit is due to:(1) dis-
satisfaction with wages, hours, working conditions, type of work,
(2) difficulty in getting along with employer and/or fellow employees,
or (3) finding a better job. An individual leaves for personal rea-
Sons if his quit is due to (1) dislike of location or community, or
(2) health or family reasons.
Our analysis will be conducted in two steps. Although in the
previous section we argued that the matching process would only be
relevant in explaining turnover in jobs of short duration, we will
initially focus on mobility from all jobs using the traditional
dichotomy of quits and layoffs, as well as a more refined definition
of quits in terms of job—related andpersonalquits. We will also
analyzethe determinants of job separations without distinguishing
between quits and layoffs. Finally, we differentiate between short
and long jobs and discuss in detail the relevance ofthe matching
process.
Ourdiscussion in Part II showed that we expect to observe a
negativecorrelation between the wage and the probability ofquitting
andan ambiguous correlation between the wage and the probability of— 15—
alayoff, ceteris paribus. Recall, however, that the quit rate was af-
fected bythe real wage (see equation (1)]. This suggests the use of a
measure of the price of time whichcaptures the value of the job to the
individual. The NtIS provides us with such a measure in terms of the
reservation wage——i.e., the wage that would induce the individual to
leave his currentjob.In the case of layoffs, thefirm makes its
decisionbased on labor costs (see equation(2)] which are bettermea-
sured by the actual wage. Moreover, there might exist personal, job
and/or family characteristics which affect the differentials given in
bothequations (1) and (2) and henceare likely to affect the quitand
layoffrates. These characteristics will be included in our empirical
formulation of the cuitand layoffequations.16
A. The Determinants of Quits
Table 3 presents the estimated quit regressions using the reserva-
tion wage as the wage variable. Since the dependent variable is defined
as being equal to unity if the individual quit his job andzerootherwise,
16The probability of quitting can bewrittenas:
qI f(w)dw
w
whereiisthe reservation wage and f(w) is the wage offer distribution
facingindividuals of given skills. In principle, for a given wage
offer distribution the quitratewould be exactly determined by the
reservation wage. Since ourmeasureof the reservation wage is corre—
latedwith f(w) across individuals of varyingskills, the variables
measuring hwnancapitalalso serve to standardize for the wage offer
distribution.— 16—
TABLE3k
Maximum-LikelihoodLogit Regressions on the Probability of













b t b t b t b t
' —.0173(—3.17) —.0148 (—2.93) —.0071 (—2.32) —.0052 (—1.62)
NOTTAKE—.0896(—4.43) —.0620 (—3.65) —.0459 (—3.31) —.0369 (—2.65)
STEADY .0242 (.79) —.0005 (—.02) .0118 (.76) .0261 (1.42)
ACCEPT .0147 (.23) —.0506 (—.73)
— — .0394 (1.20)
OTHER —.0623(—1.34) —.0733 (—1.53) — — —.0050 (—.20)
LIKE —.0646(—2.73) —.0422 (—2.15) .0133 (.70) —.0296 (—1.92)
PENS —.0565(—3.36) —.0470 (—3.28) —.0265 (—2.66) —.0155 (—1.39)
PUBLIC—.0685(—2.03) —.0810 (—2.34) —.0235 (—1.24) —.0048 (—.25)
DEVP .0006 (.54) .0006 (.58) .0005 (.74) .00003 (.04)
DEVN .0004 (.13) .00005 (.02) .0010 (.62) .00C05 (.03)
WKS —.0012 (—.53) —.0009 (—.51) —.0041 (—1.83) —.0005 (—.37)
SPELLS .0803 (4.04) .0514 (3.14) .0381 (3.31) .0381 (3.21)
EDUC .0036 (1.30) .0030 (1.29) .0024 (1.54) .0009 (.53)
REM .0023 (1.40) .0029 (1.49) .0016 (1.65) .0002 (.22)
HLTH —.0156 (—.82) —.0071 (—.44) —.0009 (—.07) —.0098 (—.79)
LIQ .0001 (.19) .0007 (—.67) —.0001 (—.53) .0003 (1.16)
OWN —.0203(—1.06) —.0131 (—.81) —.0030 (—.26) —.0110 (—.90)
RES —.0002 (—.59) —.0002 (—.53) .0001 (.40) —.0001 (—.34)
MAR —.0113 (—.37) —.0043 (—.16) .0043 (.21) —.0081 (—.42)
WLFP .0334 (1.48) .0258 (1.38) .0149 (1.22) .0127 (.81)
WW .0006 (.07) .0040 (.60) .0031 (—1.83) —.0040 (—.59)
N 1724 i654 1588 1608
,2 118.33 96.207 52.843 42.523
**




=thereservation wage rate as of 1966
w =theactual wage rate as of 1966
NOTTAKE=1if individual would not accept a new job at anywage
STEADY =1if individual would accept a steady job
ACCEPT =1if individual would accept a job at an unknownwage
OTHER =1if individual gave anyotherresponse to the reserva—
ation wage question
LIKE =1if individual liked his job "verymuch"or "fairly well"
PENS =1if private pension plan existed at the firm
PUBLIC=1if individual wasemployedby the government
DEVP=differencebetween usual hours of work in the current job
and mean hours of work ifthedifference is positive
DEVN =absolutevalue of this difference if itisnegative
WKS =numberof weeks unemployed in 1965—66
SPELLS =numberof spells of unemployment in 1965—66
EDUC=yearsof schooling
REM =remainingyears of work experience
HLTH =1if individualwas in good health
LIQ =liquidassets in thousands of dollars
OWN =1if individualowned a house
RES =yearsliving in the current residence as of 1966
MAR =1if individualwas married
WLFP =1if individual'swife was employed
NW =wife'swage rate— 18—
theestimation technique utilized is maximum likelihood logit.17 It is
importanttoutilize this technique since ordinary least squares does
not take account of the restriction that the probability of quitting
should lie in the (0, 1] interval. The logit method of estimation
.th, .. assumesthat the probability that the iindividualquits his job is
givenby the logistic function:
-
] (8)
where x is a vector of independent variables,
such as the wage, job characteristics and
human capital variables.
The logit coefficient, .,showsthe percentage change in the odds of quit-
ting fora one unit change in x.. The marginal effect of x. on q. is given
by:
clq.
8. q.(1 —q.) (9) 3x, jii j
Thesemarginal effects, evaluated at the mean, are the logitcoefficients
presentedin the tables.
17For a theoretical discussion of the problems encountered inestimating
equations with dichotomous dependent variables see Nerlove and Press (1973).— 19—
Theregressions in Table3examine the determinants of the probabil-
ity of quitting between 1966 and 1969.18 Some regressions on the prob-
ability of quitting in the five—year period, 1966—71, are presented below.
1. The Reservation Wage
Our measure of the reservation wage is based on the question:19
Q: Suppose someone in this area offered you a job in the same
line of work you are in now. How much would the new job
have to pay for you to be willing to take it?
Individuals responded to this question by either giving a numerical wage or
by answering that:(a) they would not accept a job at anywage;(b) they
would accept a steady job at the same or less pay; (c) they would accept a
job but did not know at what wage; and (d) any other response. About half
of oursampleresponded with an actual reservation wage. For those in-
dividualswho gave one of the above reasons, we set the reservation wage
equal to the actual wage but at the same time we standardize with a set
of dummies indicating the actual response. The dummies we use to corre-
spond to the above answers are (a) NOTTAXE, (b) STEADY, (c) ACCEPT, and
(d) OTHER.2°
18Note that the sample sizes in Table 3 are different in each column.
This is because for each regression we defined the relevant sample as
those individuals who did not change jobs plus those who changed for the
particularreason under analysis. We use this method in order to answer
the question of what determines a particular type of separation versus
staying on the job.
1966 Questionnaire, Question 29a.
201n effect what we are doing is tousethebest available information
(i.e. the actual wage) for those individuals who did not report a reserva-
tionwage. The dummies capture the fact that the true reservation wage
was unavailable forthis groupof individuals. SeeDagenais (1973) for
a discussion of the econometric problems encountered with missing infor—
mation.— 20—
Inregression 3.1 we estimate the equation for all quits;thatis,
the dependent variable is coded as unity if the individual quit his job
in 1966—69, and zero if he did not change jobs at all. We find that
the effect of the reservation wage is negative and significant.21 Its
magnitude indicates that a one dollar increase in the amountrequired
to induce the individual to change jobs decreases the probability of
quitting by about 16 percent in this saxttple.22 It is also interesting
to note the effects of the duimnies indicating the individual's response
tothe reservation wage question. For example,those individuals who
respondedthatthey would not accept a job at any wage(NOTTA)are
83 percent less likely to quit a job than individuals who gave a nuineri—
cal reservation wage. Thus the qualitative response to the reservation
wage question in 1966 was as important as the quantitative response in
indicating which individuals were more likely to quit in the next three
23 years.
21Thereare tworeasonsfor our using the 1966 wage rate even though
weexamine mobility during the subsequent threeyears: (1) it is impor-
tant to havea baseperiod inorder to assign a wage to thoseindividuals
whodidnotchangejobs;(2) in this age group the wage rate at anypoint
intime should be a stable measure of the individual's stock of human
capita]..
22 *
Thisnumberiscalculated by dividing the coefficient on w by the
mean probability of quitting which is .11.
23Note that since the effect of NOTTAXEisfive times the effect of a
one dollar increase in the wage, individuals who responded that they
would not take a new job at any wage were, in effect, indicating they
would require a five dollar wage increase to change jobs. Since the
mean wage is under four dollars, this group of individuals requires
more than adoubling of thewage in order to change jobs.— 21—
Wecanextend the empirical analysis by noting that theNLSpro-
vides detailed information on the reasons for quitting. We segment the
sampleinto two major categories: quitting for job—related reasons and
quitting for personal reasons. One could arguethatthe reservation
wage should have a weaker effect in the case of personal (or exogenous)
quits since when unexpected personal problems arise, the"value" of the
job,as measured by the reservation wage, becomes a less critical fac-
tor in the individual's decision to quit. This is, in fact, what the
results in Table 3 indicate. In regression 3.2, we find that a one
dollar increase in the reservation wage significantly lowers the prob-
ability of a job-related quit by 21 percent. On the other hand, in
regression 3.4, we see that a one—dollar increase in the reservation
wage lowers the probability of an "exogenous" quit by only 12 percent.
We can isolate from the men who quit for job—related reasons a
small group of individuals who quit because they found a better job-—
that is, men who were "pulled" from the current job by a better job
offer. It would appear that the reservation wage should have a strong
negativeeffect onthe probability of finding a better job, since these
individuals most closely resemble the typical decision maker in search
models. The resultsin Table 3confirm this ext,ectation. From regres-
sion 3.3, we can calculate that a one—dollar increase in the reservation
wage makes the individual 23 percent less likely to find a better job.
In order to make our results comparable with those from other data
sets,andbecause the reservation wage is defined for only half our
sample,we estimated the logit regressions using the actual wage as the
relevant measureof the price of time. The estimated equations are— 22—
shownin Table 4. The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained
using the reservation wage: A one—dollar increase in the wage reduces the
probability of a job—related quit by 26 percent, but reduces the prob—
ability of an exogenous quit by only 6 percent. The similarity between
the twosetsof coefficients should not be surprising. The basic differ-
ence betzeen w andwis that the reservation wage incorporates the value
of nonpecuniary aspects of the job. Since our vector of standardizing
variables includes a measure of job satisfaction, we are in a sense hold-
ing constant these noripecuniary differences; in fact, we may be "double—
counting" variations in these differences thereby weakening the effect
of w on the quit rate.
2. Job Characteristics
A vector of variables describing the characteristics of the individ-
ual's current (1966) job is included in the regressions in Tables 3 and
4. We find that individuals who liked their jobs (as measured by LI)
were 60 percent less likely to quit in the next three years. It is im-
portant to note that the probability of being "pulled" from the job is
not affected by the individual's level of job satisfaction; LIXE has an
insignificant effect in equation 3.3. This result is intuitive since an
individual maylikehis current job very much but if a better job offer
is found he will accept it.
Ithas been argued that the existence of private pension systems in—
24 hibits jobmobility. While ourresultsin ecuation 3.1 strongly support
thishveothesis (that is, the probability of quitting is inversely related
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b t b t b t b t
w —.0160 (—2.33) —.0183 (—2.74) —.0128 (—2.70) —.0025 (—.69)
NOTTAKE—.0754(—3.82) —.0505 (—3.05) —.0407 (—2.97) —.0323 (—2.36)
STEADY .0382 (1.26) .0110 (.41) .0172 (1.10) .0305 (1.68)
ACCEPT .0286 (.45) —.0409 (—.59) .0452 (1.38)
OTHER —.0484 (—1.05) —.0619 (—1.29) —.0008 (—.03)
LIKE —.0674 (—2.85) —.0445 (—2.27) .0142 (.74) —.0310 (—2.00)
PENS —.0569 (—3.35) —.0447 (—3.09) —.0229 (—2.27) —.0163(—1.45)
PUBLIC —.0676 (—2.00) —.0784 (—2.26) —.0196 (—1.03) —.0050 (—.26)
DEVP .0007 (.61) .0005 (.47) .0003 (.39) .0002 (.20)
DEVN —.0001 (—.05) —.0003 (—.13) .0009 (.59) —.0003 (—.19)
WKS —.0008 (—.39) —.0008 (—.45) —.0040 (—1.87) —.0003 (—.20)
SPELLS .0774 (3.90) .0499 (3.04) .0369 (3.24) .0358 (3.06)
EDUC .0027 (1.00) .0029 (1.28) .0029 (1.83) .0003 (.14)
REM .0022 (1.30) .0019 (1.40) .0015 (1.53) .0002 (.20)
HLTH —.0175 (—.92) —.0071 (—.44) .0001 (.01) —.0109 (—.87)
LIQ .00004(97) —.0007 (—.69) —.0001 (—.53) .0002 (.92)
—.0218 (—1.13) —.0132 (—.82) —.0009 (—.08) —.0113 (—.88)
RES —.0002 (—.34) —.0002 (—.50) .0001 (.39) —.0001 (—.26)
MAR —.0129 (—.42) —.0026 (—.10) .0074 (.35) —.0072 (—.37)
WLFP .0358 (1.59) .0254 (1.37) .0125 (1.02) .0153 (.95)
WW —.0006 (—.08) .0035 (.55) .0035 (.89) —.0046 (—.69)
N 1724 1654 1588 1608
112.37 94.33 55.29 40.01
*
Thenonlinear constraints in the logit procedure resulted in the deletion
ofACCEPT and OTHER.— 24—
tothe existence of a private pension plan in the firm), it is interesting
to consider the differential effects of pensions (PENS) on the probability
of quitting for job—related versus personal reasons. From equation 3.2
we find that individuals who had a private pension plan were 67 percent
lesslikely to quitfor job-related reasons; yet in equation 3.4the
existence of a pension plan reduces the probability of exogenousquitsby
only 36 percent andisstatistically insignificant.25 It should be noted
that the negative effect of PENS mightbethe result of a simultaneous
relationship between the existence of private pension plansandthe prob-
ability of quitting. If the availability of a private pension plan is
dependent on job tenure andiffuture separation rates arecorrelated
with job tenure, then the pension coefficient could reflect the influ-
ence of job tenure on the existence ofa private pension olan. Aswill
beseenbelow, once job tenure isintroducedinto the equation, the ef-
fect ofPENS on the probability of quitting is, in fact, diminished.
Wealso have evidence that institutionalfactors have strong ef-
fects on job mobility. For exaxnnle, we find that individuals in the
public sector are69percent less likely to quittheir jobs.This
resultsuggests that either public employment inhibits job mobility or
that individuals who prefer job stability choose public sector jobs.
We can also analyze the effect of union membership on the probability
of quitting. Since the NLS does not provide a measure of union
25A more comniete study of the effects ofpension plans onseparation rateswould takeintoaccount the tvoeofvesting provisions in the plan.
Unfortunately,theNLSdatado not providethisinformation.— 25—
membershipuntil the 1969 survey, we canonlyanalyze its effect on the
probability of quitting between 1969 and 1971. We find that an individ-
ual who was a member of a union in 1969 was 75 percent less likely to
quithis job during the next two years, not holding jobtenure con—
26,27 stant.
Finally, wealso included twovariablesto measure the extent of
unemploymentthatthe individual hasundergone during the past year:
WKS,the number of weeks unemployed, andSPELLS,thenumberof spells
ofunemployment. Generally, we find that WKS hasan insignificant
effecton the probability of quitting with one importantexception:
Theprobability of being pulled from the job by getting a better job
offeris inversely related to WKS, holding SPELLS constant. This find-
ing could be interpreted as evidence that peoule who have long periods
of unemployment might be viewed as undesirable job applicants by firrs,
thus lowering their probability of being pulled from the job. In fact,
an additional week of unemployment leads to a decrease of 13percent in
theprobabilityof finding a better job offer. Onthe other hand,
SPELLS hasa strong positive effect on the probability of quitting for
all groups. On the average, an additional spell of unemt,loyment, hold-
ing WKS constant, roughly doubles the probability of quitting
26For the sake of brevity, theseregressions are not given in the tables.
27Thereis a possibility that the negative effect of union member-
ship on the quit rate is due to a simultaneous relationship in that
people who have little job stability would have no incentive to join
unions.— 26—
thecurrent job.This effect is probablydueto the fact thatSPELLS is
aoroxy for job separations that occurred within the pastyearprior to
enteringthe current job. Thus it indicates that mobility is most likely
at early stages of tenure.
This effect is even more strongly observed through the use of the
variable TENURE (current job tenure as of 1966) in Table 5. This table
contains ordinaryleastsquares regressions using the reservation wage
as the wage variable; the maximum likelihood logit program wouldnot
convergein the estimation of these regressions.28 The effect of TENURE
on the probability of quitting is strong].v negative for all samples,
although for the sake of brevity we only show the ecuation for all quits.
Forexample, fromequation 5.1 we obtain the fact that an additional
year at the current jobreduces the probability of quittingby 15 per-
cent. This result can be explained through the use of the specific
traininghypothesis. That is, there is a positive correlation between
the volume of specific training andjob duration thus inhibiting in-
dividuals with longer job tenure, ceteris aribus, from quitting. As
explained in Part II, an alternative hvoothesis is that individuals
and employers view the first few years of a job as a trial "match."
If either the employer or employee find the match incompatible then
job separation will occur. According to this hypothesis, once this
initial trial period has elapsed, we would expect mobility not to be
28To enable the reader toproperly interret the results in Table 5,
AppendixTables A—l andA—2 present OLS regressions replicating Tables
3 and4in the text.AcendixTables A-3 andA—4present OLS regres- sions that include job tenure anduse boththe reservation wage andthe
actual wage for all samnles.— 27—
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b t b t
w —.0032 (—1.14) 0 —2 .4116 (12.34)
N0TTA —.0372 (—2.36) 3 —5 .0802 (2.31)
STEADY .0316 (.91) 6 —8 .0501 (1.44)
ACCEPT —.0059 (—.08) 9 —11 .0462 (1.28)
OTHER —.0568 (—1.60) 12 —14 —.0212 (—.60)
LI1 —.0862 (—3.24) 15 —17 —.0094 (—.27)
PENS —.0300 (—2.00) 18 —20 .0048 (.13)
PUBLIC —.0645 (—2.61) 21 —23 —.0162 (—.46)
DEVP .0002 (.19) 24 —26 —.0038 (—.10)
DEVN —.0010 (—.38) 27 —29 —.0048 (—.12)
WKS —.0026 (—1.05) 30 —32 —.0018 (—.04)













Thesecoefficients are obtained from OLS regressions.
**
Thisregression includes all the variables that are in regression
5.1 except TENURE.— 28—
affectedby job tenure. This implication can be tested by breaking up the
TEIflJRE variable into a set of duirtmies.Wealso do this in Table5where
we only show the coefficients of the job tenure dummies, although all
the variables shown in equation 5.1 were included in the regression.
The results are striking. The probability of auitting the job within
the first three years of job tenure is 378 percent higher than that of
quitting after 33 years of job tenure. This percentage effect drops
dramatically to 74 percent in the second three years of job tenure.
Thereafter, no significant relative effects of job tenure on the prob-
ability of quitting are observed, although weak positive effects ecist
until eleven years of job tenure. These results support the "matching"
view of mobility since the effect of tenure is much stronger in the
early years.
It is importanttonote thattheintroduction of job tenure into
the quitregressionreduces the significance of several variables, for
example, the wage rate which becomes insignificant and •ension plans
which become less significant. In our discussion of the effects of
privatepension plans, we had indicated that the pension plan variable
could be simultaneously related to the quit rate through job tenure.
The results in Table 5confirmthis hyothesis. Similarly, once job
tenure is held constant, the wage effect is diminished since wage
levels and job tenure are strongly and positively correlated.29 The
question arises, however, as to whether a correctly specified quit
29Fora detailed discussion of therelationship between job tenure
andwagelevels, see Sorjas(1975).— 29—
functionshould include job tenure as an exogenous variable. It can be
argued that the same process which determines the probability of quitting
in 1966—69 also determines job tenure as of 1966, since tenure in the
current job is the result of the process determining mobility in earlier
periods. To the extent thatthevariables determining job mobility in
the 1966—69 period also determined tenure in the current job as of 1966,
it is not surprising that the coefficients on the other variables are
affected significantly. In fact, it is worth noting that the R2 obtained
inestirtatina a regression of the quit rate on job tenure is only slightly
smaller (.12) than the explanatory power obtained by including job tenure
in addition to the personal, human capital, and job—related variables.
3. Persona]. Characteristics
The regressions in Table3 alsoinclude a set of variables describ-
ing theindividual's background,finances, marital status and other
characteristics. Overall, these variables have little effect onthe
probability of quitting. For example, while education has a positive
effect on quits, it is always insignificant. Similarly, time remaining
in the labor force (defined as the exuected age of retirement minus
current age) has a weak positive effect onthe probabilityof quitting.
This is consistent with aninvestmentview of job mobility. That is,
thelonger thetimeremainingin thelabor force the larger the payoff
to any investment in mobility; thus themorelikely the individual is
toquit his job. Moreover, REM has no effect on the probability of
quitting for persona]. reasons since for these individuals quitting is
not an investment decision, but the result of exogenous factors.— 30 —
Finally,a duyindicatingthe wife's participation in the labor force
(WLFP)hasthestrongest effect of all the persona].characteristics.
Itspositive effect can be interpreted as evidence of an intra—fainily
substitutioneffect. That is, individuals whose wives have a close
attachment to the laborforceare more likely to have a weaker attach-
ment to their jobs. It is interestingtonote that WLFPis weakest
for individuals who quit their jobsfor personal (exogenous) reasons.
Thisis consistent with the hypothesis that cuitting for personal rea-
Sons is a response to an exogenous shift in the individual's opnortu—
nity set and cannot be readily explained by systematic shifts in
economic variables.
4. Quits Between 1966 and1971
Table6 presents the equations estimating the determinants of the
probability of quitting between 1966 and 1971. This ødifies the
previous empirical analysis by extending the period under study to in-
clude a downturn in the business cycle. By comparing Tables 3 and 6,
itcanbeseen thatwith one exception theresults for 1966-71 are
identical to those for 1966—69. The exception is the estinated effect
of education. Recall that EDUC had a weak effect on the probability of
quitting in 1966—69; in Table6,however, EDUC hasa positive and sig-
nificant effect.We had showninPart II that education would have a
positive effect on the probability of quitting because of theexistence
of specific training.— 31—
TABLE6
Maximum Likelihood Logit Regressions on the Probability
ofQuitting Between 1966 and 1971
*
6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4
Quit forJob- Quit Because FoundQuitfor Per-
AllQuits RelatedReason Better Job sonalReason
b t b t b t b t
—.0169 (—3.04) —.0137 (—2.69) —.0040 (—1.39) —.0060 (—1.77)
NOTTAKE —.0760(—3.73) —.0447 (—2.61) —.0259 (—2.14) —.0420 (—2.88)
STEADY .0002 (.04) —.0094 (—.30) .0091 (.50) .0094 (.43)
ACCEPT —.0342 (—.42) —.0527 (—.68) .0043 (.09)
OTHER —.0495(—1.07) —.0835 (—1.56) .0052 (.22)
LIKE —.0373(—1.39) —.0333 (—1.50) .0015 (.09) —.0124 (—.70)
PENS —.0718 (—4.05) —.0574 (—3.76) —.0238 (—2.36) —.0234 (—1.99)
PUBLIC —.0828 (—2.38) —.1045 (—2.72) —.0269 (—1.35) —.0077 (—.41)
DEVP .0008 (.61) .0009 (.90) .0009 (1.59) —.0004 (—.42)
DEVN .0006 (.20) .0002 (.07) —.0002 (—.11) .0003 (.13)
WKS —.0007(—03) —.0001 (—.03) —.0024 (—.89) .0000 (.00)
SPELLS .0545 (2.50) .0314 (1.68) .0130 (.71) .0262 (2.05)
EDUC .0068 (2.36) .0039 (1.64) .0023 (1.45) .0038 (1.99)
REM .0026 (1.48) .0036 (2.34) .0014 (1.34) —.0007(—.62)
HLTH —.0076 (—.38) .0004 (.02) —.0001 (—.01) —.0080 (—.62)
LIQ .0001 (.22) —.0001 (—.10) —.0001 (—.31) .0002 (.70)
OWN .0130 (—.64) —.0075 (—.44) .0004 (.04) —.0063 (—.47)
BBS —.0004 (—.84) —.0004 (—1.15) .00004 (.16) .00002 (.06)
MAR —.0080 (—.24) —.0202 (—.74) —.0103 (—.54) .0008 (.04)
WLFP .0411 (1.75) .0233 (1.20) .0119 (.94) .0217 (1.37)
WW .0006 (.08) .0032 (.46) .0012 (.27) —.0025 (—.40)
N 1654 1585 1510 1530
95.313 80.822 29.850 36.136
*
Thenonlinear constraints in the logit procedure resulted in the deletion of
ACCEPT and OTHER.— 32—
B.The Determinants of Layoffs
Our analysis of mobility has concentrated on separations initiated
by the individual. In this section we focus on separations initiated by
the firm. The NLS data provide two categories of firm-initiated separa-
tions: layoffs and discharges. Since most of these separations are
layoffs, weignorethe distinction between the twocategories.Table 7
presents the set of layoff regressions both for 1966—69 and 1966—71.
1. The Wage
In studying worker-initiated mobility, we argued that the relevant
wage variable underlying the individual's decision to quitwasthe
reservation wage, Clearly when we analyze firm-initiated separations the
relevant wage variable should be the actual wage, since the actual wage
ismore positively correlated than the reservation wage with the firm's
labor costs. Note that the actual wage has a positive (but insignificant)
effect on the probability of being laid—off. This finding is consistent
with a specific—training hypothesis only if there is a negative corre-
lation between firm—financed and worker—financed specific training. A
more likely explanation is provided by the hyoothesis discussed in Part II
that workers are comensated for working in jobs that have high layoff
ratesby receiving higherwages. We can test this hypothesis further by
includinga set of industry dummies in the regression in orderto capture
theinter—industry differences in layoff rates •Withinan industry one
would expect a weaker relationship between layoff rates and wages. In— 33
TABLE 7
MaximumLikelihood Logit Regressions on the




b t b t
w .0057 (1.38) .0048 (1.05) 0
NOTTAKE —.0427 (—2.45) —.0343 (—1.74)
STEADY .0497 (1.82) .0747 (2.26)
ACCEPT —.0163 (—.20) .0746 (1.13)
OTHER .0030 (.09) .0328 (.84)
LIKE —.0055 (—.21) .0010 (.03)
PENS —.0479 (—3.10) —.0891 (—4.89)
PUBLIC —.1680 (—3.41)
DEVP .0023 (2.44) .0024 (1.66)
DEVN —.0017 (—.72) .0010 (.39)
WKS .0022 (1.49) .0018 (.82)
SPELLS .0710 (5.00) .0683 (3.52)
EDUC —.0076 (—3.10) —.0020 (—.67)
REM .0008 (.55) .0027 (1.49)
HLTH —.0021 (—.12) .0621 (2.52)
LIQ —.0037 (—2.21) —.0032 (—2.17)
OWN .0289 (1.43) .0005 (.03)
PES —.0001 (—.38) .0001 (.32)
MAR —.0222 (—.72) —.0219 (—.63)
WLFP .0014 (.08) —.0094 (—.46)




Thenonlinear constraints in the logit procedure re-
sulted in the deletion of PUBLIC.— 34—
fact,the wage coefficient is reduced by about 50 percent once industry is
30 heldconstant.
2. Job Characteristics
Whilejob satisfaction (LI) had a negative and significanteffect
on quits, ithas no effect on theprobability of being laidoff. A riori,
however,this result is not as obvious as it seems. That is, one could
argue that individuals who like their jobs are better workers and are less
likely to be laid off. Alternatively, if LI is positively correlated
withfringe benefits andhence labor costs, the layoff rate would be
positivelyrelated to LIKE. Theobserved coefficient then is the result
oftwocoposing forces. It is also worthwhile to note the negative and
significant effect of pension plans on layoffrates. This would be con-
sistent with the hynothesis that individuals who have pension plans at
their firms strive for better job performance in order to reduce the
probability of being laid off.
The results in Table 7 show that unemployment in the last calendar
year (as measured by WKs and SPELLS) is positively related to the prob-
ability of layoff. These variables, of course, could be proxies for
someundesirable characteristics of theworker thus increasing the rob-
ability of involuntary turnover.
30Theonly positive andsignificantindustry coefficient was construc-
tion (the omitted industry was agriculture) which had a coefficient of
.106 and a t-value of 2.26. It is interesting to note that the industry
variables do not signflcantly affect the wage coefficient in the quit
regression(for example, see Table 10).— 35—
Jobtenure is introduced into the layoff equation in Table8. Regres-
siori8.1 shcws that job tenure has a strong negative effect on the prob-
ability of layoff: An additional year of job tenure decreases the prob-
ability of layoff by 12 percent. Again this could be due to the exis-
tence of firm—financed specific training, although as canbeseen in Table
8, the relative effect of job tenure becomes zero past the first three
years of employment. This finding would tend to su art the "matching"
hypothesis discussed earlier. It is interesting to note the difference
in the effects of the job tenure dummies betzeen quits andlayoffs. There
isa much sharper decline in the effects of the tenure dumties in the lay-
off regression. This could be evidence of some degree of job seasonality.
Duetothe construction of the data set, termination of temporary jobs
could not be distinguished from actual layoffs. Thus it could be that
the strong effect ofshortjob tenure on the probability of being laid
off is merely evidence of a largeproportion of "layoffs" that are
actuallyseasonal jobs.31
Wealso found that unionmembership had aweak positive effect on
the probability of being laid off between 1969 and1971,not holding
job tenure constant. This could occur because in unionized firmsthe
employerwould have less flexibility in reducing wages. Therefore, the
only alternative open to himinthe face of a reduction in product de-
mand might be to cut employment.32
31Appendix TableA—5presents OLSregressionson the layoff rate in
1966—69 with and without job tenure.




Effectof Job Tenure on the ProbabilityofBeing
LaidOffBetween 1966 and 1969
Maximum 1ieljhood logit regression. The nonlinear constraints in
the logit estimation procedure resulted in the deletion of PUBLIC.
Ordinaryleast squares. This regression includes all the vari-










0 .0086 (1.99) 0 —2 .3165 (10.70)
NOTTAKE —.0168 (—.91) 3 —5 —.0057 (—.18)
STEADY .0437 (1.49) 6 —8 —.0403 (—1.30)
ACCEPT —.0291 (—.35) 9 —11 .0027 (.08)
OTHER —.0064 (—.17) 12 —14 —.0533 (—1.73)
LIKE —.0235 (—.85) 15 —17 —.0197 (—.64)
PENS —.0228 (—1.40) 18 —20 .0018 (.05)
PUBLIC — — 21 —23 —.0281 (—.91)
DEVP .0014 (1.38) 24 —26 —.0457 (—1.41)
DEVN —.0028 (—1.16) 27 —29 —.0398 (—1.12)
WKS —.0002 (—.10) 30 —32 —.0321 (—.95)















One striking difference between the quit and layoff regressions is
the effect of education. As discussed in the previous section, educa-
tion had a positive and insignificant effect on the probability of quit-
ting.Theresultsin Table7 showthat education is an importantdeter-
minant of layoff rates: an additional year of schooling reduces the
probability of being laid off by 9 percent. This finding is consistent
witha specific training hypothesis only if there is a negative corre-
lation between firm—financed and worker—financed specific human capital.
A more likely explanation isthatjobs requiring more human capital are
less unstable. Note that the effect of education on layoff rates is
weakerin1966—71. It appearsthatduringthe1969—71 downturninthe
businesscycle the more educated men were more likely to be laid-off
than duringthe 1966—69 period, thus more closely resembling the less
33 educated individuals.Finally, note that the positive effect of the
wife'swage is consistent with our earlier evidence of an intra—family
substitution effect.
C.TheDeterminantsofSeparations
In this section we analyze the determinants of job separations with-
out distinguishing between quits and layoffs. It will be recalled that
the matching hypothesis discussed in Part II predicted that there is no
33it is important to note that the 1969—71 recession was not typical of
other business cycle downturns. Usually a downturn inthe cycleincreases
thedifferentialbetween the layoff rates of the less educated and highly
educatedworkers.— 38—
usefuldistinctionbetweenquits and layoffs in studying the determinants
ofjob mobility. Table 9 presents the regressions estimating the deter-
minants of the separation rate.Aninteresting conclusion to be drawn
from Table 9 is thatthe explanatory power of the independent variables
inthe separation rate equation (whether measured in terms of X2 or R2)
is higher than the explanatory power of these variables in the separate
quit and layoffequations.
Thecoefficients in equation 9.1 are mostly weighted averages of the
coefficientsobserved in the separate quit and layoff equations reported
in regressions 4.1 and 7.1. Note, however, that although thematching
hypothesis predicts a negative correlation between separation rates and
the wage rate when job tenure is not held constant, the results inTable 9
donot support this predicticn.
ID.Separations from Short andLongJobs
Contrary to the matching hyothesis, our ana1ys in Sections A and
B indicate that it is imvortant to distinguish between quits and layoffs
in analyzing the determinants of job seoarations. Moreover, the results
in Section C only partially supportthematching view of job mobility.
However,we arguedinPart IIthat the matching hypothesis is most relevant
during the early years of job tenure. Therefore, in order to more accu-
rately test the matching hypothesis, we divide oursampleinto individuals
whose job tenure as of 1966 is less than or equal to threeyears (short
jobs) and individuals whose tenure is longer than three years (long jobs).
It is interesting to note that the probability of a job separation for
individuals in short jobs is 53 percent, and 56 percent of these separa-
tions are quits. For longer jobs the respective statistics are 7percent— 39—
TABLE9
Determinants of the Probability of Separating Between 1966 and1969
91* 9.2** 93**
Variable bt b t b
w —.0052 (—.79) —.0035 (—.75) .0039 (.87)
NOTTAXE —.1006 (—4.39) —.0823 (—4.50) —.0460 (—2.64)
STEADY .0628 (1.70) .0759 (1.88) .0582 (1.53)
ACCEPT .0104 (.12) .0163 (.19) —.0301 (—.38)
OTHER —.0454 (—.91) —.0420 (—.99) —.0532 (—1.33)
LIKE —.0714 (—2.28) —.0816 (—2.57) —.0828 (—2.76)
PENS —.1015 (—5.00) —.0966 (—5.43) —.0550 (—3.23)
PUBLIC —.1854 (—3.74) —.1292 (—4.21) —.1241 (—4.28)
DEVP .0028 (2.10) .0030 (2.22) .0014 (1.10)
DEVN —.0002 (—.06) —.0002 (—.08) —.0020 (—.72)
WKS .0015 (.63) .0029 (1.08) —.0002 (—.07)
SPELLS .1270 (5.47) .1655 (6.53) .1408 (5.86)
EDUC —.0026 (—.80) —.0034 (—1.19) —.0022 (—.82)
REM .0027 (1.35) .0025 (1.39) —.0024 (—1.40)
HLTH —.0158 (—.68) —.0145 (—.68) —.0035 (—.42)
LIQ —.0018 (—1.40) —.0005 (—.98) —.0002 (—.37)
OWN —.0002 (—.01) —.0010 (—.04) .0076 (.37)
RES —.0004 (—.88) —.0004 (—.93) .0003 (.66)
MAR —.0325 (—.86) —.0252 (—.72) —.0036 (—.11)
WLFP .0309 (1.34) .0290 (1.35) .0283 (1.39)









and59percent. To test the relevance of the matching model, we estimated
separation, quit, andlayoffregressions setarate1y for short and long
jobs. The wage coefficients from these regressions are given in Table
10.
Oncewe take account of the compensating differential effect on the
probability of a layoff by holding industry constant, we find that the
actualwage has no effecton the probability of separating, quitting, or
beinglaid off from a short job. In Part II, we showed that, according
to the matching hypothesis, there was no distinction between quits and
layoffs, and that the wage rate would not be related to either when
analyzing separations from jobs of short tenure. The results in Table 10
seen to indicate that the matching process is useful for understanding
the determinants of separations from short jobs.
For longer jobs, wages are negative and significant in determining
the orobabilitv of separatingor quitting, and have a weak, negative ef-
fect on the probability ofa layoff. Once we realize that the layoff
coefficientmay have a tositive bias if we are not adequately controlling
for compensatory differentials, these findings are consistent with a
specific training hypothesis that assumes a positive correlation between
worker—financed and firm—financed specific training investment.
It is important to note that theresults inTable10are not af-
fected bythe introduction of job tenure into the regressions. The wage
coefficients from these regressions are shown in Appendix Table A-6. In
the case of long jobs, job tenure is often insignificant and the wage




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































substantiallyincreased when job tenure is held constant. Therefore,within
the set of long jobs, there appears to be little need to standardize for
job tenure. In the case of short jobs, however, tenure has a significant
negative effect andincreasesR2 substantially although the wage coeffi-
cients are still insignificant in the quit equation. This result, there-
fore, indicates that the matching process may take place in a very short
span of time within the job.
The reader might wonder why the results in our earlier tables point
out the need to differentiate between quits and layoffs even though most
mobilityoccurs early inthe job and the matching hymothesis explains
thisturnover. The answer relates to the fact that in the pre—retirement
years,most individuals arein long jobs, and a regression pooling the
twogroups (short and long jobs) would be heavily weighted toards an
analysisofthedeterminants ofmobilityfrom long jobs.
E.SerialCorrelation InJobMobility
Inour discussion of job tenure, we have already found that individ-
uals who have short current job duration are much more likely to separate
from thejobeither through quit orlayoff. This would suggest that there
is astrong serial correlation injobmobility. Wecanfurther explore
this relationship by examiningtheeffects of mobility in 1966—69 onthe
probability of job separation in 1969—71.
InTable11,wepresent selected coefficients from regressions est—
mating the probability of quitting and being laid-off in 1969—71. The
results are quite striking. The probability of quitting the 1969 job in
the 1969—71periodis227 percenthigher ifaquit occurred in1966—69,— 43—
*
TABLE11








b t b t
Quit in
1966—69 .1003 (5.89) .1036 (5.10)
Laid off
in 1966—69 .1259 (6.06) .2102 (8.96)
Sample
size 1747 1788
*Allof these coefficients were obtained from
ordinary least scuaresregressions.— 44—
whileit is 286 percent higher if a layoff occurred in 1966—69. On the
other hand, the probability of being laid off in 1966—71 is 157 percent
higherif a cuit occurred inthe previousthree years, whileit is 318
percent if a layoff occurred in the 1966—69 period. We can summarize
these results by noting that the probability of quitting does not de-
pend on the nature of the previous job separation, while the probabil-
ityof layoff is more strongly related to a previous layoff than to a
previous quit. This result, of course, could be due to the fact that
terminations of seasonal jobs are coded as layoffs in theNLS.More
generally,the results in Table 11 show that certain individuals are
chronicmovers. It is well knownthatturnover rates decline with age,
yetwe find that within this group of middle—aged men there exists a
subsetof individuals who aremovingcontinuously. Moreover, itis
interesting that the nature of the earlier separation does not strongly
determinethe nature of the subsequent separation once we account for
somedegree of seasonality in the layoff group.
In summary, the evidence from Tables 10 and 1]. suggest the Irnoor—
tance of the matching process in the first few years of job tenure once
weabstract fromtheeffect of coxnensating differentials in jobs that
have high layoff rates. As predicted by the matching hyothesis, we
observean insignificant wage coefficient in the regressions explaining
quits and layoffs from short jobs. Moreover, the importance of the
matchingprocess within thejob is highlighted by the fact that the
nature of theprevious separation does not determine the nature of the
separation from the current (short) job.— 45—
III.The Consequences of Job Mobility
The previous sections have focused on an analysis of the determinants
of job mobility. We nowextendourstudyby concentrating on the effects
of job mobility on the earnings profile. Previous work on the NLSby
Borjas(1975) and Parnesand Neste]. (1975) hasfound thatquitters had
wagegrowth over the survey neriod at least as great as the non—changers.
It is important to note, however, that these studies examined thewage
growth of these different groups contemporaneously with the job change.
Thus their results captured a mix of both the immediate and future gains
in wages from job mobility. We extend their work in severalrespects.
First, we distinguish between the immediate gains from job mobility and
the future gains from job mobility. We comnare individuals who quit
their jobs in 1966—67 (and did not change jobs thereafter) with individ-
uals who stayed with the same employer throughout the five—year period.
The relevant comparisons are the iximiediate wage gains (i.e. 1966—67) and
future wage growth (1967—71). This enables us to answer the question of
whether the effect of mobility on the earnings rofi1e is a parallelup-
ward shift.The second contribution ofour analysis is to distinguish
between job—relatedquitsandquits due to exogenous reasons as well as
between quits and layoffs. Of course, theapriori expectation isthat
ifa quit is to pay at all, it should pay for those individuals who left
theirjob because ofa better job offer. Finally, we will briefly analyze
theeffects of the different types of job separation onjob satisfaction.
In inter reting theeffects of job mobility, however, one should bear in
mind that individuals who leave their job mightleave precisely because
they have lower wage growth. Moreoveranother problem arises in that we— 46—
comparethe wage growth in the early years of job tenure for movers with
the wagegrowth in the later years of job tenure for stayers. Thus com-
paring the subsequent wage growth of movers to that of the stayers might
yield a biased estimate of the true effect of job mobility.
A. Thmediate Wage Gains
Colus 12.1 arid 12.2 in Table 12 present the regressions explain-
ing percentage wage growth in the 1966—67 period for individuals who
either did not change jobs at all in 1966-71 or who changed jobs in
1966—67 only. By including a set of durmties indicating the nature of
job mobility we are able to measure the immediate gains from mobility
sinceeach dtmny variable gives usthe percentage difference in wages
betweenchangers andnon—chancers.34 Co1tnns 12.3 and 12.4 present
similar regressions explaining 1966—69 percentage wage growth. In
these latter regressions, the sample includes individuals who either
did not change jobs at all in 1966—71 or who changed jobs in 1966—69
only. The duy variables indicating job mobility therefore capture
the gainstomobility that occurred in 1966—69. note that this
definitionofimmediate wage gains entails a longer period, arid is
therefore less exact thantheanalysis of 1966—67 wage growth.
34Note that the sample sizes in this section have declined slightly.
This is due to our restricting the sarnnle to men who reported their
wage in periods subseauent to 1966. Also note that our use of per-
centage wage growth (and not absolute growth) is suggested by the
han capital modal of wage determination. For an exposition of the
model see Mincer (1974).— 47—
TABLE 12*









b t b t b t b t
LAYOFF .1044 (2.12) .0901 (1.58) .0158 (.41) .0420 (.98)
PERSONAL .0730 (1.04) .0417 (.55) .0290 (.54) .0098 (.16)
PULL .1180 (1.46) .0927 (1.10) .1847 (3.17) .1797 (3.01)
PUSH —.1076 (—1.15) —.1537 (—1.56) .0143 (.27) .0076 (.14)
EDUC —.0066 (—2.68) .0023 (.86)
REM .0040 (2.33) .0036 (1.94)
MAR2 - .1809 (2.50) .0490 (.88)
MARl —.2316 (—3.09) —.0834 (—1.43)
TENURE .0003 (.36) —.0013 (—1.45)
wizs .0005 (.18) —.0000 (—.04)




DDUNC .0007 (.53) .0029 (4.28)
Saxnt,le






1 if individual quit because
1 if individual quit because
1 if individual quit because
with his job
=1if individual was married
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=3.if individual changed occupations during the
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=changein DuncanOccupationalIndex that occurred











he founda better job
hewas dissatisfied
at the end of the
at the beginning of— 49—
InTable12,fourdummy variables areused to capture the effect of
job mobility on wage growth: LAYOFF, indicating whether or not the in-
dividual was laid off from the 1966 job; PERSONAL, indicating if the
individual quit his 1966 job for exogenous reasons; PULL, if the quit
took place because he found a better job; and PUSH, indicating that the
quit took place because of dissatisfaction with his 1966 job. The ex-
cluded group, of course, are those individuals who did not change em-
ployers.
Generally, the dimmy variables indicating type of quit are insig-
nificant except for the effect of PULL on 1966—69 wage growth. We find
that individuals who quit the 1966 job because they found a better job
have percentage wage gainsthatare18percent higher in 1966—69 (or
6 percent higher per year) than those whostayed. In the 1966—67
period, however, the effect of PULL is 12 percent per year. Moreover,
in this shorter period the effect of PUSH is negative andslightly
significant. Note that these results point out the need for di3tinguish—
ing between different types of quits. That is, in order to correctly
estimatethe effects of job mobility on wage growth, one needs to know
the motivating force behind the individual's decision to quit. This
finding is even more strongly observed when we utilize a more detailed
breakdownof quitsas in Table 13. Onestriking result is thediffer-
ence in the effects of the several categories which composed PUSH in
Table 12:(a) individuals who quit due to dissatisfaction with wages;
(b) individuals who quit due to dissatisfaction with working conditions;
and(c) quittingdue to interoersonal relations. it is worthnoting— 50—
TABLE13
Regressions on Immediate Wage Gains from Job Mobility
Using Detailed Reason of Quit





b t b t
Layoff .1044 (2.13) .0158 (.41)
Health .1264 (.91) .0694 (.71)
Disliked location .0071 (.03) .0913 (.78)
Disliked wages .1385 (.99) .1232 (1.58)
Disliked work —.2226 (—1.60) —.0850 (—1.02)
Interpersonal
relations —.6319 (—2.27) —.0539 (—.39)
Found better job .1180 (1.46) .1847 (3.18)
Other reasons .0648 (.73) .0256 (.32)
Family problems —.3589 (—1.16)
Sample size 1289 1383
R2 .01 .01— 5].—
thatboth quits due to dissatisfaction with work and quits due to inter-
personal problems in the job have strong negative effects on the immediate
wage gain, while quits due to dissatisfaction with wages have a positive
effect which becomes significant in the 1966—69 period. Thus If an in-
dividual disliked a nonpecuniary aspect of his job, he is willing to
trade away some of his wages. As will be seen below, the trade is "fair"
sincethese individuals gain significantly in terms of job satisfaction.
These findings show that to examine the effects of quits onwagegrowth
itis important to distinguish between the different types of quits;
otherwise,the net impact of quitting will be a conglomeration of many
diverse effects.
The effect of LAYOFF on the immediate wage growth is interesting.
We find that individuals who were laid off in 1966—67 had a significant
increase in their wage growth as compared to the non—movers. Yet in
1966—69, LAYOFF during that period has no effect on contemporaneous wage
growth. Thus we conclude that men who were involuntarily separated from
the 1966 job do at least as well as those who did not change jobs in the
1966—71 period. This could be due to the fact that our sampleoflay-
off s is restricted to "successful" searchers——that is, men who were laid
off in 1966—67, but stayed with the new employer for the remaining four
35
years.
We also included a vector of personal and job characteristics in
the regressionsin Table 12.Overall,these variables are not good
351fwedo not restrict the sample to successfulsearchers, the effect
ofbeing laid off ontheimmediate wage gain becomes insignificant, though stillpositive. The coefficient is .0317 Ct =.91).— 52—
predictorsof an individual' s wage growth.36 The most stable results are
the effects of time remaining in the labor force, REM, and changes in
marital status. We find that REM has a positive and significant effect
on wage growth. Theoretically, the effect of REM on wage growth is
ambiguous.First, the longer the time remaining, the higher the payoff
toon—the—job investment. Clearly, more investment wouldtake place at
youngerages, creating a positive relationship between REM andwage
growth.Onthe other hand, it canbeargued that the later in the life
cyclethequit occurs, .themore incentive there is to get as largean
immediate wage gain as possible. This could be tested by examining the
effect of REMon the wage growthof individuals who quit. However,the
resultsstill show a positive effect of REM on wage growth. Thus it
seems that the investment hypothesis dominates. We also find that in-
dividuals who suffered a marital breakup during the period (MARl =1
andMAR20), experience smaller wage growth during this period.
The 1969 NLS questionnaire provides additional information on the
nature of thejob change. In particular, it gives us data on whether the
individual had a newjob lined up nrior to the separation, The data show
that47 percent of thce who r!uithada new job versus 12 er—
cent of those who were laid off. 'oreover, within the grouo of quitters,
63 percent of those who quitforjob—related reasons had a new job
versus 12 percent of those who quitforexogenous orpersonalreasons.
Thesimilarity between the latter group and the individuals who were
36SeeBorjasand Mincer (1976) for an analysis of the determinants of
individualwage growth.— 53—
laidoff points out the exogenousnature ofthese cuits. It is important
to note that having a new job lined up has a strong positiveeffect on the
1969—71wage gain of individuals who changed jobs during that oeriod in-
dicating the significance of on—the—job search. However, even when we hold
having a new job constant2we still find that it is important to distinguish
37
amongtyesof separat.ons. i•!oreover interaction terms between hav:ng a
job lined up and nature of the separation were generally insignificant.
Finally, we compared the effects of separating from a short job
(tenure .3years) aid separating from a long job (tenure >3years).
Recall that in explaining the determinants of separating from a short
job we found that there was no meaningful. distinction between quits
and layoffs. The question arises as to whether in studying the con-
sequences of separating from short jobs one should distinguish between
quits and layoffs. We find, that in comparing individuals who separated
from short jobs with individuals who stayed in short jobs the results
reported in Table 12 still hold, i.e., there is a meaningful distinction
between quits and layoffs. In comparing individuals separating from
37The regression explaining imediatewage growth between 1969 and 1971
are as follows:
PC6971 =— .0363LAYOFF +.0371Job Related Quit
(—.95) (.67) R2 =.006
—.2346Personal Quit
(—2.75)
PC6971 =— .0440LAYOFF —.0228Job—Related Quit
(—1.15) (—.37) R2 =.01
—.2429Personal Quit +.0968Had
(—2.85) (2.41)— 54—
longjobs with individuals staying in long jobs, one importantnewresult
is obtained: being laid off from a long job has a significantnative
effect on inediate wage growth. Quitting from a long job has the same
effects as those reported in Table 12.
B. Future Wage Gains
We have already shown that job mobility creates discontinuous shifts
in the individual's earnings profile. We now consider whether mobility
in the pre—retirement years has anyeffecton the subsequent wage growth
in the new job, i.e., on the slope of the earnings profile. Again, we
consider two timeoericds:1967—71 for individuals who changed in 1966—67,
and 1969—71forthosewho changed in 1966—69. Theresults are presented
inTable14.
Themost striking result is the negative and significant effect of
LAYOFFon future wage growth. That is,even though the immediateeffect
of a layoff on wage growth is positive, over the long run these individ-
uals exnerjence smaller wage growth than those men who stayed on the job.
Generally, the effects of a quit on future wage growth are insignificant,
except for the coefficient of finding a better job on 1969—71 wage growth
which is negative. However, even for this group, the net gain of a quit
over the five—year period, 1966—71, is positive. The fact that quitting
in general has an insignificant effect on future wage growth suggests
thatthe gain to voluntary mobility (at least for those who were "pulled"
fromthe job) isone of animmediate wage gain rather than a continuing
increase in wages.Thisresultmight be due tothe agerange of the
sample.Clearly at older ages, the finiteness of life wouldimplylittle— 55—
TABLE14
JobMobility Effects on Future Wage Growth*





b t b t b t
—
b t
Layoff —.1349 (—2.15) —.1349 (—2.15) —.0986 (—2.33) —.0986 (—2.33)
Personal
reasons .0066 (.07) —.0088 (—.15)
Found
better
job —.0411 (—.40) —.0411 (—.40) —.1152 (—1.82) —.1152 (—1.82)
Disliked
job .1290 (1.09) —.0345 (—.60)
Health —.1253 (—.70) —.0655 (—.61)
Disliked
location .0672 (.27) .0223 (.17)
Disliked
wages .1467 (.82) —.0168 (—.20)
Disliked
work .0900 (.51) —.0673 (—.74)
Inter-
personal
relations .2144 (.60) .0003 (.00)
Other
reasons .0472 (.42) .0217 (.25)
Faini ly
problems —.2768 (—.82)
N 1289 1289 1383 1383
R2 .01 .01 .01 .01
*
"Future"wage growth is defined as:
Equations 14.1 and 14.2 =percentagewage groith in 1967—71.
Equations14.3 and 14.4=percentagewage growth in 1969—71.— 56—
on—the—jobinvestment taking place. Thus these individuals undertake mo—
bility not as a means of finding jobs which provide higher levels of job
investment but as a method of obtaining an immediate increase in wages
by shifting to higher, but parallel (to that of stayers), earnings
profiles.38
C. Nonpecuniarv Gains
Up to this point we have analyzed the effects of job mobility on
wage growth. In this section, we explore its effects on job satisfac-
tion. We defined an individual as "liking" his job if he indicated
that he liked his job "very much" or "fairly well." Table 15 shows
the percentage of individuals who liked their jobs in 1966 and 1969 by
type of job separation during this period. The results are extremely
interesting. About 93 percent of the individuals who stayed in the job
in the 1966—69 period liked the job in 1966, while only 83 percent of
those who quit their job in the next three years were satisfied with
their 1966 job. It is remarkable that by 1969, the percentage of in-
dividuals who liked their jobs was 94 percent for both groups. In fact,
most of the increase in job satisfaction for those individuals who quit
is due to the increase attained by those individuals who were "pushed"
out of the 1966 job—that is, those individuals who left the 1966 job
because they were dissatisfied with a job—related characteristic such as
wages,work, and interpersonal relations.
381t is imPortant, however, to note thatour analysis was carried out
in percentage terms and since the stayers have higher average wage levels
thanthe quitters, those who remain in the job achieved larger absolute
wage increases in the survey period.— 57—
TABLE15















Stayers 93.2 93.5 1,219
Involuntary changers 88.1 94.0 67
Voluntary change dueto:
Any reason 82.5 93.8 97
Pushed 77.1 97.1 35
Pulled 89.7 96.6 29
Personal 83.3 77.7 18
Other 80.0 100.0 15— 58—
Theresults in Table15are quite important since they provide empir-
ical. evidence that an individual does not necessarily leave his job in
order to achieve a money wage gain. In fact, for thegrounsthat achieved
a significant increase in job satisfaction we find insignificant money
wagegains (see Table 12), while for the grouo that was '1pulled" from the
1966 job and that achieved significant money wage gains, only a small in-
crease injobsatisfaction can bedetected.
IV.Summari
Thispaper has analyzed the determinants and consequences of middle—
age job mobility. Traditional analysis has distinguished between two tyes
of separations: au.tts and layoffs. It can be argued by viewing the job
as a marriage between employer and worker that this distinction has no
empiricalcontent and addsnothing to our understanding of the determi-
nants of job separation. On the other hand, persons quitting their jobs
forpersonal reasons may not have the same economic motivationas those
whoquitfor job—related reasons. This latter argument would suggest an
even more detailed breakdown anng types of auits. By utilizing this
latter breakdown of job separations we obtainedseveral major empirical
findings:
1.Theoretical, models of job separation are couched in terms ofa
reservation wage. We took advantage of the fact that the NLS provides
this information, and as expected we found that the probability of
quitting for job—related reasons was significantly and negatively re-
lated to thereservationwage when job tenure was not held constant.
The probability of quitting for personal. reasons, however, was less— 59—
stronglyrelated to the reservation wage since this type of quit is due to
exogenous forces. Once job tenure was held constant, the effect of the
wageon quit rates was diminished in all samples.
2. The availability of a pension plan had a strong negative effect
on job-related quits but did not determine quitting for personal reasons.
Similarly, personal characteristics such as time remaining in the labor
force andthewife's labor force status badsystematiceffects on job-'
related quits and insignificant effects on exogenous quits. These find-
ingswere invariant to the inclusion of job tenure in the regression.
3. The probability of layoff was positively related to the in-
dividual's wage rate and this effect became stronger when job tenure
was held constant. The positive wage effect can be explained by compen-
sating differentials individuals in jobs with a high degree of insta-
bility will demand higher wages. Indeed, when industry was held constant
in the regression, the positive wage coefficient was diminished.
While the above results support the argument that the quit-layoff
distinction as wellas a more detailed breakdown of quits is meaningful,
our analysisshowed that the matching hypothesis has relevance as well:
4. We found strong evidence of serial correlation in job mobility.
In particular, we observed that most senarations occur during the first
fewyearsof job tenure. This result is evidence of a matching process
between firmand workerthatoccursin the early years of the job as
both parties learn about each other.
5. The nature of previous job separations was not a strong deter-
minant of the nature of future job separations.This finding conforms
with the predictions of the matching hypothesis that the quit-layoff
breakdown is uninformative.— 60—
6.Since it can be argued that the matching hypothesis is most rele-
vant for short jobs,weseparately analyzed the determinants of searations
of short jobs versus long jobs. Cnce we took account of thecompensating
differential effect operating in the layoff equation, we found that the
wage rate had no effect on the probability of separating, quitting, or
being laid off from a short job. The distinction between quits and lay-
offs, however, remained in the analysis of long jobs.
Finally, we analyzed the consequences of job mobility during the pre—
retirement years. Our analysis focused on the effects of job mobility on
wage growth and job satisfaction:
7. We found significant evidence of the need to distinguish between
types of quits. In particular, we observed that individuals who were
pulled (i.e. foundabetter job) from their jobs had higher immediate wage
gains than stayers, while individuals who were pushed (i.e.weredis-
satisfied with the current job) had smaller wage gains than stayers. We
also foundthatin this age range, quitting did not affect the slope of
the earnings profile in the new job.
8. Job mobility affected not only the individual's money wages, but
also his degree of job satisfaction. For example, while individuals who
quit because they were dissatisfied with their current job had negative or
zeroimmediate wage gains (relative to the stayers), they experienced
significant gains in job satisfaction. These individuals evidently quit
not for wage gains, but for nonecuniary aspects of the job.
The reader will recall that at the outset of this pacer, we discussed
several hypotheses which are useful in understanding the determinants and— 61—
consequencesof job mobility. The findings presented in this paper indicate
that once we take account of compensatory differentials in jobs with high
layoff rates, the matching view of job turnover is relevant for explaining
separations from short jobs. In the case of long jobs, however, the
evidence points to the relevance of specific training in explaining job
turnover.— 62—
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TableA—i
OLS Regressions on the Probability of Quitting Between 1966 and 1969
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—.0076(—2.59) —.0055(—2.27)—.0032 (—1.98) —.0027(—1.34)
NOTTAKE —.0697(—4.24) —.0478 (—3.50) —.0341(—.10) —.0277(—2.47)
STEADY .0400 (1.10) .0060 (.19) .0242 (.15) .0446 (1.72)
ACCEPT .0321 (.45) —.0401 (—.63) —.0551 (—.21) .0703 (1.41)
OTR —.0537(—1.45) —.0536(—1.71) —.0452(—.15) —.0056(—.22)
LIKE —0878(—3.15) —.0650(—2.71) .0122(.13) —.0405(—2.02)
PS —.0592(—3.82) —.0514(—3.92) —.0263(—.10) —.0160(—1.48)
PUBLIC—.0633(—2.45) —.0631(—2.89) —.0225(—.12) —.0073(—.41)
DEVP .0014(1.17) .0013(1.23) .0009(.03) .0003(.37)
DEVN .0008 (.29) .0004 (.16) .0008(.48) .0005(.24)
—.0002 (—.07) .0002 (.09) —.0036 (—2.19) —.0004(—.23)
SPELLS .1127(4.45) .0731(3.32) .0496(.13) .0637(3.59)
EDUC .0013 (.74) .0013 (.62) .0018(.0k) .0006(.33)
.0020(1.26) .0019(1.41) .0013(.03) .0002(.20)
—.0193(—1.04) —.0116 (—.74) —.0025(—.11) —.0108(—.33)
LIQ .0001 (.12) —.0002 (—.39) —.0002(—.58) .0003(.80)
—.0238(—1.23) .0162(.98) .0027(.11) .0112(.92)
-.0002 (—.66) .JOO2(.61) .0001(.35) ,0001(_.35)
—.0128 (—.42) —.0040 (—.15) .0032(.14) —.0031(—.38)
.0359(1.77) .0297(1.73) .0170(.11) .0121(.36)
—.0015 (—.22) .0007 (.12) .0010(.24) —.0030(—.65)
N 1724 654 1598 1608
R2 .071 .058 .035 .032— 65—
TableA—2
OLS Regressions on the Probability of Quitting between 1966 and 1969
usingtheActual Wage (without job tenure)
QuitforJob— QuitBecauseFound QuitforPer—
AllQuits RelatedReason Better Job sonalReason
b t b b t b
w0 —.0079 (—1.97) —.0071(—2.09) —.0045(—1.91) —.0018(—.64)
NOTTAKE—.0604 (—3.81) —.0416(—3.11) —03O5(—3.23) —.0246(—2.24)
STEADY.0482 (1.33) .0119 (.38) .0277(1.24) .0478(1.85)
ACCEPT.3406 (.56) —.0345 (—.54) —.0518(—1.15) .0737(1.48)
OTHER—.0451 (—1.22) —.0472(—1.51) —.0414(—1.88) —.0025(—.10)
LIKE —.0899 (—3.23) —.0662 (—2.76) .0117 (.66) —.0417(—2.09)
—.0599 (—3.86) —.0515 (-3.93) —.0263 (—2.83) —.0166(—1.53)
PL'BLIC—.0624 (—2.42) —.0624 (—2.86) —.0220 (—1.44) —.0070 (—.39)
DEVP .0013 (1.12) ..0012 (1.20) .0007 (1.01) .0003 (.39)
DEVN .0001 (.03) .0001 (.03) .0007 (.43) .0000 (.00)
.0000 (.00) .0003 (.12) .0035(2.18) .0003 (—.17)
SPELLS .1124 (4.43) .0733 (333) .0497 (3.10) .0683 (3.67)
EDUC .0015 (.60) .0014 (.63) .0119 (1.28) .0002 (.12)
P.EN .0019 (1.23) .0018 (1.39) .0013 (1.38) .0002 (.19)
..m —.0195 (—1.05) —.0114 (—.72) —.0022 (—.20) —.0111 (—.86)
LIQ .0000 (.08) —.0001 (—.32) —.0001 (—.48) .0002 (.67)
ot. —.0251(-1.30) .0168 (—1.02) .0028 (.24) —.0121(—.89) s —.0002 (—.64) .0002 (—.62) .0001 (.33) .0001(—.31)
MAR —.0129 (—.42) —.0029 (—.11) .0041 (.22) —.0090 (—.43)
tpp .0379 (1.86) .0303 (1.76) .0170 (1.40) .0136 (.97)
—.0022 (—.32) .0003 (.05) .0008 (.21) —.0034 (—.74).




OLS Regressions on the Probability of Quitting between 1966 and 1969
usingthe Reservation Wage (with job tenure)
QuitforJob— QuitBecauseFound OuitforPer—
AllQuits RelatedReason Better Job sonalReason
b t bt bt bt
w —.0032 (—1.14) —.0023 (—.96) —.0017(—1.00) —.0011(—.56)
N0TTAK—.0372 (—2.36) —.0248(—1.8) —.0230(—2.39) —.0163 (—l.4)
STEADY .0316 (.91) .0057 (.18) .0237 (1.07) .0410 (1.61)
ACCEPT—.0059 (—.08) —.0599 (—.98) —.0633 (—1.42) .0543(1.11)
OTIR —.0569(—1.60) —.0548(—1.81) —.0461 (—2.12) —.0085 (—.34)
LIRE —.0862 (—3.24) —.0663 (—2.86) .0082 (.47) —.0425(—2.15)
PETS —.030() (—2.00) —.0235(—2.22) —.0158 (—1.72) —.0050(—.55)
PL'BLIC—.0645 (—2.61) —.0631(—3.00) —.0239(—1.59) —.0104(—.59)
EVP .0002(.19) .0004 (.44) .0004 (.56) —.0001(—.11)
DEVN —.0010(—.38) —.0009 (—.40) .0002 (.11) —.0002(—.13)
WKS —.0026 (—1.05) —.0013 (—.84) —.046(—2.84) —.0015(—.82)
SPELLS .0929(3.82) .0597(2.31) .0446(2.83) .0637(3.47)
EDUC .0023(1.16) .0018 (.90) .0021 (1.4.0) .0010(.56)
—.0020 (—1.31) —.0012 (—.91) —.0002 (—.20) —.0013 (—1.13)
—.0154(—.87) —.0081 (—.53) —.0010 (—.09) —.0097(—.76)
LIQ .0003(.67) .0000 (.10) —.0001 (—.25) .0003(1.08)
—.0153 (—.85) —.0120 (—.75) .0000 (.00) —.0069(—.50)
.0003 (.77) .0002 (.53) .0003 (1.14) .0001 (.49)
MAR .0036 (.12) .0077 (.31) .0081 (.45) —.0030 (—.14)
wrs .0362 (1.86) .0291 (1.75) .0170 (1.43) .0130(.94)
—.0052 (—.82) —.0023 (—.42) —.0005 (—.12) —.0045 (—.99)
rENt--.0089 (12.48) —.068 (—10.97) -.0033(—7.43) -.0035 (—6.77)
• N 1724 1654 1583 1608
.149 .122 .059— 67—
TableA—4
OLS Regressions on the Probability of Quitting between 1966 and 1969
using theActualWage (withjobtenure)
QuitforJob— QuitBecauseFound QuitforPer—
AllQuits RelatedReason Batter Job sonalReason
b t b t b t B t
—.0020 (—.52) —.0024 (—.71) —.0023 (—.96) .0004 (.1L)
N0TTA(E—.0334 (—2.15) —.0222 (—1.70)—.0211 (—2.25) —.0149 (—1.36)
STEADY .0352 (1.01) .0082 (.27) .0255 (1.16) .0425 (1.67)
ACCEPT —.0024 (—.03) —.0575 (—.94) —.0616 (—1.39) .0563 (1.15)
OTEER —.0533(—1.51) —.0522 (—1.73) —.0441 (—2.04) —.0074 (—.29)
—.0377 (—3.29) —.0670 (—2.90) .0079 (.45) —.0435 (—2.21)
—.0307 (—2.04) —.1287 (—2.24)—.0159 (—1.72) —.0065 (—.60)
PUBLIC —.0643 (—2.60) —.0629 (—2.99) —.0235 (—1.57) —.0104 (—.59)
0EV? .0002 (.21) .0004 (.43) .0004 (.52) —.0001 (—.07)
DEVN —.0015 (—.59) —.0011 (—.51) .0001 (.07) —.0006 (—.34)
ws —.0025 (—1.01))—.0017 (—82) —.0045 (—2.83) —.0014 (—.77)
SPELLS .0924 (3.80) .0596 (2.80) .0446 (2.83) .0632 (3.44)
EDUC .0023 (.97) .0017 (.84) .0021 (1.41) .0006 (.33)
—.0020 (—1.33) —.0012 (—.93) —.0002 (—.22) —.0013 (—1.19)
—.0159 (—.89) —.0082 (—.54) —.0009 (—.08) —.0101 (—.79)
.0003 (.56) .0000 (.08)—.0001 (—.21) .0003 (.92)
.0169(.91) .0125 (.79) .0001 (.00) .0076 (—.56)
.0003 (.80) .0002 (.54) .0003 (1.13) .0001 (.54)
stAR .0025 (.08) .0077 (.31) .0035 (.47) —.0042 (—.20)
.0381 (1.96) .0297 (1.79) .0171 (1.44) .0144 (1.04)
—.0057 (—.89) —.0025 (—.46)—.0006 (—.14) —.0048 (—1.06)
TENURE —.0090 (—12.56) —.0068 (—10.99)—.0033 (—7.42) —.0036 (—6.86)
N 1724 1654 1588 1608
.148 .122 .06P .059— 68—
TableA—5
OLS Regressions ott the Probability of Being Laid Off
between 1966 and 1969
b t b
.0040 (1.13) .0077 (2.19)
NOTTAKE —.0339 (—2.41) —.0175 (—1.27)
STEADY .0545(1.68) .0501(1.53)
ACCEPT —.0206 (—.31) —.0360 (—.55)
OTHER .0035 (.11) —.0041 (—.13)
Lfl —.0114 (—.44) —.0193 (—.77)
PENS —.0595(—4.31) —.0392(—2.83)
PUBLIC —.0893 (—3.84) —.0901(—3.96)
DEVP .0023 (2.25) .0016(1.60)
DEVN —.0005 (—.21) —.0014 (—.62)
W}ZS .0041 (1.97) .0023 (1.10)
SPELLS .1346 (6.59) .1256 (6.30)
EDUC —.0065 (—2.89) —.0060 (—2.73)
REM .0008 (.59) —.0016 (—1.20)
HLTH —.0014 (—.08) .0016 (.10)
LIQ —.0006 (—1.40) —.0004 (—1.03)
OWN .0265 (1.52) .0308 (1.81)
RES —.0002 (—.64) .0001 (.36)
MAR —.0138 (—51) —.0053 (—.20)
WLFP .0011 (.07) .0011 (.06)
ww .0088 (1.91) .0061 (1.35)
TiRE —.0061 (—9.45)
N 1679 1679
R .106 .151*
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